Colombia’s communications infrastructure experienced significant after the magnitude 7.4 earthquake on August 10, 2026. Effects were concentrated in western departments—especially Chocó, Valle del Cauca, Risaralda, Quindío, and Caldas—with intermittent service nationwide initially due to congestion.
Only a few days later things are returning to normal as far as infrastructure is concerned. The power grid is coming back online and communications systems are mostly restored.
Main Disruptions
Network congestion: A sudden surge of calls and data traffic from people checking on family/friends and contacting emergency services overloaded the communications network. Communications networks are designed to operate on the principle that only a small percentage of people will actually be using their phone at any given moment, but a wide-ranging incident creates a rush on the system which will usually overload it. BTW, Texting uses less system resources, and can also be queued for later delivery during congestion, making it a good way to communicate during an emergency.
Power outages: Interruptions to electricity (affecting ~18% of national demand initially, with rapid recovery to ~99%) disabled or limited cell towers and equipment once backup batteries/generators ran low.
Physical/infrastructure damage: Some damage to fiber-optic cables (from ground shifts or collapses), towers, and related equipment; possible antenna misalignment. Damage was more limited than the congestion and power issues in many areas.
Access and logistics challenges: Damaged roads, landslides, and ongoing aftershocks hindered repairs, particularly in remote or hard-hit zones like parts of Chocó. Internet connectivity disruptions were confirmed by monitors (e.g., NetBlocks, Cloudflare data showing traffic drops).
Amateur Radio Response
Amateur radio provided critical backup emergency communications support during the response, particularly where commercial cellular, internet, and power systems were disrupted.
The Liga Colombiana de Radioaficionados (LCRA / LCR) activated its emergency network. Members deployed alongside the Colombian Red Cross to deliver communications support. Faber Mosquera (HK6F), the LCRA emergency coordinator, coordinated with the National Disaster Risk Management System for damage assessments in the hardest-hit areas; later joining the urban search-and-rescue team (Colombian Red Cross, Quindío Chapter) as it deployed to Cali.
Asociación de Radioaficionados del Eje Cafetero (ASOREC, Colombia's ARRL counterpart) made its infrastructure (including repeater stations) available to support communications in Pereira, one of the most severely damaged cities. Volunteers under president Nahir Rios (HK6JSP) had water, food, and backup power sufficient for at least 72 hours.
Liga Radio Manizales (LRM, a regional radio club) linked its Echolink system to the national emergency frequency, connecting with ASOREC and extending reach.
Impact of Amateur Radio
Amateur radio filled gaps created by widespread power outages, cellular congestion, and damaged telecom infrastructure—especially in the early hours and in areas with limited commercial connectivity. It supported coordination between responders (including Red Cross search-and-rescue teams), facilitated damage assessments, and helped maintain links in affected cities such as Pereira, Manizales, and Cali.
This role was typical of amateur radio’s function in major disasters: providing independent, battery- or generator-powered HF/VHF links that do not rely on the public telephone or internet networks. While commercial services recovered progressively over the following days, amateur radio networks offered resilient backup during the critical initial response phase.
Press releases from IARU and ARRL emphasize activation and coordination rather than specific quantified outcomes (e.g., number of messages passed or lives directly saved via radio), which is common early in the response. Hopefully we'll get additional information as time goes on.
Initial lessons learned
Our Colombian counterparts were well prepared for a 72 hour deployment, Conventional deployment theory is to have Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) which deploy for the first 24 hours, who are often 72 hour repsonders as well. In other cases it is expected the RRT would be releaved by a 72 hour team, which would then be followed by either additional 72 hour rotations or long term deployment teams.
They were equipped to function for 72 hours without drawing on any other infrastructure; they provided their own food, water, equipment, and power. This is important because resources will be strained during the initial response, and resources should be focused on those directly adversely affected by the disaster.
They had a plan, which included operating frequencies, linked repeaters, and even the ability to interface to Echolink to provide broader communications once linked repeaters were communicating into an area where internet and power was available.
Their involvement wasn't just holding a microphone at a shelter of Emergency Operations Center (EOC), but included deployment with other groups, like damage assessment teams.
